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•ABSTRACT
Over the years, ambulance delays in hospital emergency
departments have steadily become an increasing problem for
the pre-hospital care provider, or emergency medical
services (EMS). When an ambulance crew is forced to wait
in the hall of the emergency department (ED) with a patient
because there are no beds available for the patient, that
ambulance1 is not available to cover their area for other
911 emergency responses. While other ambulances cover the
area, if they transport to the hospital that is closed due
to ED saturation, they too wait for beds to become
available. There are times when multiple ambulances are
waiting in the ED for a bed for their patient. When mixed
with decreased ambulance resources ,in an area, traffic
congestion and distance from a 911 call, the delays
compound into larger complications in delivering emergency
care to the sick and injured. Even when the ambulance
clears from the hospital, their response time to a call in
or out of their area is delayed. Through a case study of.
ED delays in a middle-size urban area of North Los Angeles
County, this thesis addresses problems associated with
delays in the ED. This seven month retrospective study
reviews delay times and types from raw data extracted from
iii
the computer automated dispatching (CAD) system to
determine their true significance. Of 13,927 transports,
2058 were delayed (14.8%). Average delay time was 35
minutes for the seven month period (Range 11-109 min.),
with 905 delays >30 min., 183 delays >1 hour. The
information gained from tracking this data will serve as a
tool for determining peak times, total daily ambulance
deployment and possible ED - EMS provider partnering.
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CHAPTER ONE
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT DELAYS
Introduction
The problem of delays in treatment of emergency room
patients and the consequent shortages of available
ambulances has begun to attract the, attention of the
popular press and of local policy makers. ( This thesis is a
case analysis of the nature of delays in emergency room
admissions and the effects on ambulance dispatching and
availability as it occurred in one Southern California
community.
The Nature of Emergency Department Delays
The emergency department (ED) of any hospital is the
entry point for admission to the hospital or exit point for
transfer to another hospital. The emergency department
screens patients who need medical attention and, when
necessary, stabilizes them for transfer to another
facility.
Walk-ins, referrals and ambulance transports are the
methods of entry into the emergency department for most
patients. Each patient who enters the emergency department
1
for service is considered to occupy an emergency bed once
medical evaluation begins.
Some patients who use emergency department services
are subsequently admitted to the hospital on an inpatient
basis. Admitted patients contribute to a shortage of beds
for the hospital.
There are times when all of the available beds in a
hospital are occupied, leaving a caregiver with literally
no bed in which to place a new patient
A shortage of beds has become ,one of the most
significant issues facing hospital 'Staff and emergency
medical services (EMS). When EMS resources cannot leave
the emergency department because there is no available
hospital bed for their patient, they are not able to
respond to other emergencies. When there are no other
ambulances available in the area to respond to the
emergency call, emergency department delays directly
contribute to a potentially increased response time for the
responding ambulance, delaying care for another patient.
Patients who cannot wait for walk-in evaluation in an
emergency department may access emergency medical services
via 911 systems. Ultimately, the entire pre-hospital care
2
system may have its efficiency and .effectiveness
compromised.
Pre-Hospital Care
A system of medical professionals who "extend the arm
of the hospital," pre-hospital care brings medical
attention to the field setting. Whether the patient uses
the EMS system, or enters the emergency department, he
occupies a bed while receiving care in the emergency
department. Bed unavailability becomes one of the primary
reasons for delays in emergency departments.
Emergency Medical Services 
Regulation
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA) prevents "dumping" of uninsured patients by
hospitals with emergency departments. EMTALA ensures that
all patients receive emergency medical care regardless of
insurance status or ability to pay.
"Emergency medical services are the administration of
pre-hospital emergency medical care" (Grant 1991). An EMS
program is typically monitored and administered by the
county department of health services (DHS). DHS may have a
separate agency known as the EMS Agency that oversees
3
emergency medical services. The DHS. or-the EMS agency
regulates virtually every protocol related to patient care,
necessary equipment, assessment procedures and response
times.
Any time a hospital has no available beds, The
hospital can close due to saturation. While the hospital's
exercise of the option to close because it can no longer
handle additional patients temporarily solves their
problem, ambulances are forced to drive around until they
can find a hospital that will accept their patient.
Not having a destination for a patient affects the
ambulance provider's ability to meet its contracted
responsibilities. The county regulates public safety
agencies such as fire departments and public EMS providers.
Private EMS providers face an increased threat of losing a
contract for failing to meet mandated response times. The
government can contract with a private provider, or a
public one. If the privates do not render contracted
services, the government still must provide the service.
The purpose of this study is to examine the escalating
problem of emergency department delays and their impact on
a private ambulance provider.
4
Literature reviewed for this study revealed research
gathered primarily from hospital emergency departments'
perspectives and little from that of the of ambulance
provider. The case study conducted here confirms that, for
the provider studied, there is a growing problem of
emergency department delays, and that the problem affects
the ambulance provider on a regular basis.
The Anatomy of an Emergency
Every ambulance service that participates in a 911
emergency system has a contract with the city or county to
provide emergency and non-emergency medical transportation
and care for pre-hospital patients. In this contract the
provider must adhere to response time standards that define
i
how soon the ambulance must arrive on scene and what
percent of the time they must arrive on scene within the
time standard.
For example, an ambulance provider may accept a
contract that states that they must be on scene of the call
with 8 minutes, fifty-nine seconds1 (0:8:59) ninety percent
(90%) of the time. Urban areas meet the 8 minutes, fifty- 
nine seconds criteria, while rural'or sparsely populated 
areas have a slightly longer contracted response time. A
5
pre-hospital ambulance provider must meet response time
criteria, while the non-transporting entities do not.
If an ambulance provider fails' to meet the response
time criteria, they risk sanctions by the county,
penalties, or the loss of their contract.
Most public safety agencies (fire, police, medical)
use a dispatch system called Computer Automated
Dispatching, or CAD. CAD systems allow dispatchers to
direct appropriate resources to a 911 emergency call. From
the time the call is made from the scene of the emergency
to the time the responding units clear the scene,
information is collected in the CAD. The following is a
description of the elements of a 911 call:
1. An emergency (or potential emergency) occurs.
2. A call is made to the 911 number.
3. The call is routed to the local dispatching agency.
This could be the local police or sheriff's department
or the fire department, or a contracted multi-agency
dispatch center.
4. The dispatcher determines the nature of the call and 
responds by directing fire, police, and medical, or
all of them to the scene.
6
5. Once the call has been dispatched to the responding
units, the "clock starts ticking."
6. The ambulance must be on scene before nine minutes
expires. If they are late, it' is a point against 
them: Too many points in a given period of time
reduce the response time percentage.
7. If the ambulance transports the patient, they usually
go to the closest emergency department.
8. If the ambulance can get in and out of the emergency
department, they are available for the next call in •
their area
9. If they cannot, another unit must cover for them. If
other units cover and transport, but are forced to
wait in the emergency department, the next 911 call
I
that is made in the area could possibly exceed
response time compliance.
It is this risk of compliance failure that jeopardizes
I
a company's contract status and increases the potential for
a patient's 911 call to go unanswered in a timely manner.
1
While not every 911 call is a true emergency, each call
Imust be treated as an emergency, both from the patient's
i
perspective and the providers'.
7
ICHAPTER TWO
DELAYS FROM THE LITERATURE
Emergency department delays for an ambulance provider
may be considered an effect of upstream factors that
happened before the ambulance has ever responded to an
emergency or even arrived at the hospital.
; Delays as Normal Operations
One of the most subtle factors is when hospital staff,
given the (Current high levels of ER utilization, consider
delays "normal'' operations. In an article "Regulation of
Response Times in California," Narad and Driesbock
identified regulatory programs for ambulance response times
used by California counties to identify differences around
9
the state. "Fifty-seven percent (57%) of California
counties regulate response times most in fractional time
measurements (Narad, Driesbock, 1999).
Most of the counties with response time standards
measure from dispatch to arrival at the scene and most use
a fractional measurement to determine compliance.
Fractional measurement is the most accurate method.
Many of the ambulance enforcement programs in California
8
have enforcement mechanisms that are unlikely to promote
compliance" Narad and Driesbock (1999 133) .
This study was conducted to determine the standards
used to measure compliance in different areas of
California. Many areas require response times to be within
nine minutes in urban areas, and twenty minutes to rural
Iareas. Further, areas are broken down in terms of
population, to determine if an area is considered urban or
rural.
When an ambulance covering a certain area responds to
a 911 call in the area, another unit backs up the area.
When the covering unit gets a call, other units fromI
adjacent areas cover the area. If those units get calls,
I
the area is vulnerable to extended response times.
I
Usually, ambulances clear from the hospital in time enough
to recover the area. When an ambulance is delayed in theI
emergency department and a 911 call’is dispatched in his 
area, however, the call often is delayed due to available
units waiting in the emergency department—literally because
of no bed availability. The ambulances have arrived on
scene of the call, treated the patient, transported and
then they sit idle for extended periods of time.
9
IThough hospitals have their own concerns over being
able to handle the patient volume that the ambulances
bring, not to mention the walk-ins, the response time
compliance of the ambulance provider is not one of them. 
With the belief that waiting is an ioperating practice of
the emergency department paired with the extended delays
from emergency department saturation, ambulance providersI I
are faced with the challenge to get in and out of emergency
departments without sacrificing their contracts in the
process.
Waiting Times in New Zealand
Data was collected on patients presenting to Waikato
Hospital emergency department in New Zealand over a period
I
of seven (7) weeks. Those patients who waited more than
thirty minutes in the' waiting room or more than two hours
in the total department, were studied further. Of all
patients thirty seven (37%) percent exceeded the time of
two hours,. Mean time for this group was 175 minutes. Only 
7% stayed! in the waiting room more than 30 minutes (Havill
1996). This preliminary result was unexpected by the
authors. ■ Wait times were thought to be longer for the
10
study was conducted to determine the length of delays after
delays increased over the months leading up to the study.
Sources of Delay
Delays in the emergency department are attributed to
many factors. Each may require a different administrative
response. Havill (1996) reported 42% of delays found in
his study were related to doctors, 16% to waiting for tests
and results, 12% from prolonged treatment and assessment
and 30% were due to other reasons.
Effects on Emergency Department 
Occupancy and Delays
As mentioned previously, the lack of available
emergency department beds at the hospital is perhaps the
most common problem. ,
Among the possible reasons for bed unavailability are:
a) bed demand exceeds supply because of population growth;
b) bed closures have reduced the functional hospital size;
c) uninsured patients use the emergency department as a
primary care source thereby overloading the emergency
department; and, d) there is a shortage of staffing for
available beds. Table 1 represents the different
categories of emergency department, delays.
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Table 1. Types of Delays and Probable Causes
Delay Type Probable Cause
Homeless Patient 
Indigent Patient
When medical conditions 
deteriorate, the patient finally 
seeks care—usually after the cost 
of care is many times greater than 
the cost if the individual accessed 
•health services before the 
condition worsened
Occupied emergency 
department
Too many patients are accessing the 
emergency department system at one 
time
Not enough nurses 
to staff emergency 
department bed 
ratio
Even with enough beds, if the 
nursing ratio is not within line of 
the state or nurse union regulated 
specifications, the emergency 
department qannot take on
additional patients
Other beds within 
the hospital are 
all occupied
Also known a,s "internal disaster," 
this condition creates a backlog of 
patients needing movement to 
another unit within the hospital.
If the beds needed to move other 
patients out of the emergency 
department are occupied, the 
emergency department bed is 
unavailable for other patients
Other Hospitals are 
saturated
When other emergency departments in 
the area are on saturation, they 
too cannot accept additional 
patients. When all hospitals in an 
area are saturated, the patient's 
care becomes' delayed and impaired.
The patient is then transported to 
the closest saturated emergency 
department.
Patients Want to 
reduce wait, so 
they call 911
Shocking to many (and not to 
others), there are patients who 
call 911 in order to reduce their 
wait in the emergency department
12
Homeless Patients
Homeless or indigent patients are reported to be,
/
among users of the emergency department, the most
complicated and difficult to control of patients. A case-
control study was conducted in Massachusetts of 293
homeless, ■ 334 low-income housed children aged 3 months to
17 years,' and the mothers of the children. Information was
collected about the children's living conditions, family
type, and, health status using questions adapted from
national surveys.
The purpose of the study was to determine the
relationship of homelessness and determinants of health onI
homeless and low-income housed children. The authors
Ipredicted that these patients would use emergency services
more than other socioeconomic classes. Indeed, emergency
department and outpatient medical visits were higher for
the homeless group than others.
There were some similarities and differences between
homeless children and the comparison children. The
researchers reported that mothers of homeless children were
more likely to report their children as being in fair or
poor health compared with their housed counterparts.
Homeless children were reported to experience a high number
13
of acute illness symptoms, including fever, ear infection,
diarrhea, and asthma.
After controlling for potential explanatory factors,
homeless children remained more likely to experience fair
or poor health status [adjusted odds ratio = 2.83; 95%
confidence interval, 1.16, 4.87 and a higher frequency
[1.74. Mothers' emotional distress was independently
associated with acute illness symptoms and frequent use of
outpatient and emergency department settings (Weinreb &
Goldberg, 1998, 558).
In examining factors defining access to health
services and the use of well-child care, only small
differences were seen between the respective comparison
groups. More than 99% of both the homeless and housed
I
children had medical insurance, primarily through Medicaid.
The homeless children were significantly less likely to
/
have a regular health care provider [93% vs. 98%] (Weinreb
& Goldberg, 1998, 558).
Patients' Ability to Pay
Indigent patients exhibit similar characteristics to 
those of the homeless patient: intermittent use of medical
care, little to no use of preventive medical services,
sporadic visits to different emergency departments instead
14
of having a regular relationship with a primary care
physician. In Los Angeles County alone, sixty two percent
(62%) of uninsured families surveyed indicated difficulty
in paying for their children's' medical expenses, thirty 
five percent (35%) of the adult population was uninsured
and eighteen percent (18%) of the child population were 
reported to be uninsured (Los Angeles County DHS, 1997).
High Occupancy in the Emergency Department
Over utilization of the emergency department can
result in long waits to be seen. In 2001, The National
Center for Health Statistics published "Major Reasons Given
by Patients for Emergency Room Visits, 1998." Of a total
of 100,385 visits surveyed in the study, the top twenty
reasons a patient visited the emergency department were
given. Table 2 lists the patients' chief complaint, total
number of that complaint, the percentage of the total
100,385 (per 1,000), and1the adjusted percent. The\
adjusted percent is the percent of 100,385 minus the "all
other reasons category" (46,382 or 46.2%), since the "all
other reasons" category is so large. This adjustment
allows a consideration of the data without concealing the 
seemingly low percentage. \
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With.the exception of chest pain, which could be early
symptoms of cardiac distress, and shortness of breath,
(early signals of respiratory distress or associated
cardiac complications), the majority of the chief
complaints could be downgraded from an emergency department
visit to a primary care physician or urgent, care visit
without compromising patient care or adverse outcomes. In 
fact, many of the chief complaints'seemingly did not meet 
emergency department criteria and could have been handled
in an.urgent care or doctor's office.
The reasons for the documented.emergency department
visit were those given by the patient (Table 2). No
follow-up was studied to determine the perceived nature of
the patient's reason versus the actual nature or chief
complaint. The information provided does not indicate 
whether the patient was a walk-in to the emergency 
department or brought in by ambulance. The reasons are
predominantly non-emergency conditions.
Unfortunately, unless patients are insured, they may
not have been evaluated by a physician until visiting the
emergency department, where the ER is obligated to accept
all patients and patients' ability to pay. Whether walk-in
patients or not, an arrival still occupies a bed in the
16
emergency department resulting in one less bed for an
ambulance patient.
Table 2. Patient Reasons for 
Emergency Room Visits, 1998
Patients' Chief Complaint Total Percent
of
100,385
Adjusted 
Percent 
of 54,003
Stomach and abdominal 
pain/cramps/spasms
5, 958 5.9 11.0
Chest pain and related 
symptoms
5, 329 5.3 9.8
Fever 4, 419 4.4 8.1
Headache/pain in the head 2,867 ' 2.9 5.3
Cough 2, 471 2.5 4.6
Laceration and cuts (upper 
extremity)
2,293 2.3 4.2
Back symptoms 2,284 2.3 4.2
Shortness of breath 2,283 2.3 4.2
Throat symptoms 2,205 2.2 4.0
Pain (no specific body 
system)
1,990 2.0 3.7
Vomiting 1, 985 2.0 3.7
Earache/ear infection 1,9471 1.9 3.6
Labored/difficulty breathing 1, 690 1 1.7 3.1
Laceration/cut (facial area) 1, 623 1.6 2.9
Unspecified accident 1, 560 . 1.6 2.9
Other unspecified injury 
(head, neck and face)
1, 465 1.5 2.7
Skin rash 1, 346 1.3 2.5
Neck symptoms 1,346 1.3 2.5
Low back symptoms 1,298 1.3 2.4
All Other■reasons 46, 382 46.2
Doctors Havill and Van Alphen of the Emergency
Department in Waikato Hospital in Auckland New Zealand
studied wait times in their article "Waiting in the
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Emergency" Department" (Havill 1996) . The focus of the
article was to examine wait times in the emergency
department, reasons for waiting, and patient knowledge of
those reasons. The results point to a perceived bed
management issue.
Over' a period of seven weeks, data was collected on
patients who were seen in Waikato Hospital's emergency
department. The wait types were stratified into those who
waited >30 minutes in the emergency department waiting room
and those who waited >2 hours in the entire emergency
department -visit. Patients who waited >2 hours were
studied further, but were not the focus of the study. Only
seven percent waited >30 minutes in the waiting room. The
delay times are shown in Table 3:
Table 3. Reported Delays in the 
Emergency Room
Delays Related to Doctors 42%
Waiting for tests and results 16%
Prolonged treatment and assessment 12%
Other reasons 30%
Only 47% of the patients surveyed knew why they were
waiting. Most people understand that waiting is sometimes
unavoidable—especially anyone who .visits the emergency
18
department. What further frustrates a patient is lack of
knowledge as to why the patient must wait. Visiting the
emergency department is a stressful experience by itself.
When extended delays for care or treatment are an issue, a
patient must suffer additional stress. If a patient is in
pain, his ability to cope with the discomforts is reduced.
Simple steps to reduce a patient's anxiety would be to
update the patient at least every thirty minutes, on the
progression of the patient's visit. The amount of time
this would take is insignificant compared to the positive
results ongoing communication would render.
Frequent Users of the Emergency Department
Frequent users of the emergency department are those
who visit the emergency department■more often than the
average person. Fernandez and Pope (2000) set the
parameters of necessary use of the emergency department: "a
patient's visits were considered appropriate if he or she
required resources or physician services not readily
available in the community" (Fernandez & Pope, 2000, 1018).
These patients may or may not have health insurance, but
they still occupy a bed when they visit the emergency
department. Many patients are genuinely sick and need
attention.
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Fernandez & Pope presented a case study aimed at
identifying frequent users of the emergency department,
creating a care plan for them and monitoring its progress
(2000). The data that related to the frequent users of the
emergency department is also generalizable to the reasons
for increased bed occupancy. Over a period of twelve
months, twenty-four patients participated in a single­
subject design study to determine individual use. Before
referral to the program, the twenty-four patients accounted
I
for 616 visits to the emergency department (median 26.5);
each patient could have visited the emergency department at
least 2.2 times per month—while some individuals had not
visited the emergency department in years.
Nursing Staff Shortages
While most staff in the emergency department has
little control over the patient volume they see in a day,
they do have control over whether the patient remains on
the ambulance gurney or not. One reason for delays in the
emergency department is lack of proper staffing (Havill,
1996). The shortage of nurses in most hospitals across the
nation has increased the workload of those nurses who are
working. The desirable ratio of nurses to patients is
increasingly challenging to maintain.
20
Nurses across California have experienced an overload
of duties attributed to the nursing shortage. In April of
2002, nurses at St. Mary Medical Center in Apple Valley
California voted for and passed a nurses' union. Among the
primary reasons the unionization succeeded was nurse to 
patient ratios. In a related article, the San Bernardino 
County Sun highlighted the financial aspects of emergency
department usage. Entitled "Finances in ERs on Life
Support" (Bender 2001 B8). The writer noted "Thirteen San
Bernardino County Hospitals lost a combined $20 million
providing emergency room care during the 1999-2000 fiscal 
year, according to the California Medical Association"
(Bender 2001) . Among the top five hospitals that lostI
money on patients per visit:
i
1. Arrowhead Regional Medical Center
2. Bear Valley Community Hospital
3. Desert Valley Hospital
4. High Desert Medical Center
5. KPC Global Medical Center (Doctors' Hospital,
Montclair)
Havill has suggested that alternative services and
protocols are needed to address ER staffing shortages. 
"Waiting time in emergency departments will alter as
21
observation wards and definitive treatments by emergency
specialists increase. When the emergency department
assessment staff is available to expedite the patient
through the network of tests and procedures, wait times
decrease" (Havill 1996).
Based upon national standards, hospitals are short-)
staffed nearly 50% of the nurses they should have (Lewis
2000). Hospitals are paying skyrocketing per diem rates
for any nurse who will work for a day or two. Staff
shortage of RNs asserts that a patient cannot be properly
monitored if he does not have a nurse. Additionally, one
nurse cannot provide adequate care>for too many patients
I
without impacting the level of care and attention other
patients may need. Hospitals have'attempted unique and
different ways of recruiting nurses for their facility.
I
Sign-on bonuses, referral programs, allowing the nurse to
choose their own hours and shifts, and relocation bonuses
are all used. As fast as nursing schools can train nurses,
is as fast as the nurse can obtain employment. The ones
that have been working in the nursing field have
experienced an increased workload. Though they are being
Iasked to.do more work because of short-staffing problems,
their quality of care should never be impaired.
22
Delays Business as Usual
Authors Chinnis and White (1999) evaluate the mindset
of the nursing staff in their article entitled:
"Challenging the Dominant Logic of Emergency Department
Guidelines From Chaos Theory." The article' addresses the
predominant mindset of emergency department caregivers
regarding waits in the emergency department: The mind-set,
or dominant logic of this system of emergency department
patient flow assumes that waits are acceptable and
unavoidable, and that the function of the emergency
department is to care for only the truly emergent
patient"(1053). While this logic seems harsh, it is
accurate. Few caregivers have cold hearts for people in
need of medical attention. The nursing staff is no
different. When a patient presents in the emergency
Idepartment with symptoms that are indicative of a non­
urgent condition, the caregiver has difficulty in not 
exercising a similar logic to that1 of the emergency
department being needed for only truly emergent scenarios—
especially considering the emergency department overuse
crisis. Since EMTALA requires a medical screening for
every patient who visits the emergency department,
regardless of their ability to pay, extracting the non­
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emergent patients from the patient pool remains an
increasing challenge. ,
The Emergency Department as a Usual Source of Care
"When people want to see a doctor, they want to see a
doctor now, so they show up in the emergency room," said
Dominic Nigro, spokesman for Arrowhead Regional Medical
Center (Bender 2001). This scenario is a common occurrence
among many users of emergency medical services. Those who
use the ER as a primary care source are aware that they
will receive care whether or not they can pay for the care.
High Hospital Occupancy Rates
When a hospital's emergency department reaches its
maximum capacity, there is literally no place for patients
to be evaluated. When a room is made available upstairs,
the patient can be moved to the room, creating an open bed
in the emergency department. When all of the beds within a
hospital -emergency department are full, a Condition known
as "emergency department saturation" exists. If other beds
do not become available within the hospital via discharge,
completion of care, transfer or other means of progressing
patients forward, then the problem of unavailable beds
becomes what's termed as "internal disaster." When a
hospital is closed to emergency department saturation,
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ambulances must divert to the next closest hospital
emergency department. If all hospitals in an area are
closed, then the nearest emergency department must accept
the patient. When the emergency department accepts a
patient, the patient is not able to leave the ambulanceI
crew's gurney until there is a bed available. Crews can
wait hours in the emergency department before a bed is made
available. There are times when there are multiple crews
in the emergency department waiting for a bed. One way to
reduce the number of crews in a holding pattern at the
emergency department is to provide, the emergency department
with extra gurneys. When more than one crew is waiting
they can assume care of the newly arrived patient, allowing
the other crew to remain available for area coverage.
In a simulation model conducted in Great Britain in
the mid-1990s, a hypothetical hospital in England was
created to answer questions regarding a more accurate
estimation of bed need due to emergency admissions at an
acute hospital. The main outcome measures were "the risk
of having no bed available for any patient requiring
admission for any patient, the daily risk that there is no
bed available for at least one patient requiring immediate
admission and the mean bed occupancy rate" (Bagust, Place,
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1999, 157). The study revealed consequences for not having
a bed available for a patient. The consequences were
shared among the patient, ambulance crews, and most
heavily, the hospital:
The relation between demand, capacity and the risk of
failure was reflected in the average occupancy rate. All
rates above 85% risks became discernable, and above 90% the
hospital system was subject to regular bed crises. The
average bed occupancy rate in acute hospitals in England
78.9% in 1996-7. A projected rate! of growth in emergency
bed days of 2.5% a year suggested that the NHS as a whole
might be operating at 85% occupancy at the time of the
study and could exceed 90% by 2002-3 (Bagust, Place, 1999) .I
Once bed capacity reached greater than 85 percent,
recovery to a normal state was virtually impossible.
i
Capacity above 85 percent equated bo emergency department
saturation and only when capacity was less than 85 percent
was the emergency department not saturated. This entire
study was based upon a simulation in which certain
parameters were given using a discrete-event stochastic
simulation model reflecting the relation between supply of
available beds and the demands of emergency department
admissions. The excerpt lists demand and capacity as the
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risks with the consequences as failure to meet the supply
and demand. The consequences of failure were realized if
the demand exceeded the supply. This was measured via the
"average occupancy rate." When the occupancy rate rose to
90%--just 5% higher than the lowest possible recoverable
rate—the systems in the hospital were subject to a regular
bed shortage crisis.
What does this mean? Without a contingency plan, such
as increased nurse staffing, hospitals will undoubtedly
I
experience major complications in being able to meet the
I
demand of increased bed occupancy.' A contingency plan
could consist only of additional b'eds with staffing
comparable to the additions, once ,the occupancy rate
increases to 90%.
As this model exemplified, the problem of emergency
department delays and bed availability is not expected to
improve. No one wants to see their hospital as one that
cannot function up to its full potential or one that cannot
handle the needs of the community. Hospital administrators
are aware of the delays in their facility, they know about
cases and complaints from patients and staff alike, and
they can pinpoint the issues and consequences at hand.
Many of these administrators—along with the line staff—are
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under the popular, and all too accurate, impression that
nothing can be done about the problem. Like most problems,
one can be aware of the problem and can or cannot do
anything to repair the problem. Some deny problems exist,
while others want to fix it but have little or no resources
to correct it. In the case of emergency department delays,
the entire paradigm must be shifted in order to effectively
address the problem. There are no one-step solutions. To
solve, correct or even reduce the delay problem, numerous
simultaneous steps must be taken in order to combat the
manner in which care is offered, diverted, as well as
monitored.
Other Hospitals are Saturated
Typically when one hospital is on saturation, other
local hospitals soon become saturated as well. As the
previous section demonstrated, once a hospital reaches 90%
occupancy, the risk of failure—inability to take on
additional patients—is almost certain. With this in mind,
once an ambulance crew is enroute to a hospital that
advises them it is closed due to saturation, the crew
should pull to the side of the road until they are advised
which hospital will accept their patient. The likelihood of
their diversion to another hospital after they were
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diverted from their initial destination hospital is high.
It is not unusual for an ambulance to drive around the city
waiting to be cleared to a receiving hospital. Even when
they are cleared, they will wait in the emergency
department hall with their patient until there is a bed
available. For patients not serious enough to warrant an
I
immediate emergency department bed, the ambulance crew is
able to release the patient to triage. While the crew can
leave the hospital, the patient is not too happy about
having to wait once again in the emergency department
waiting room.
Notification Times
In a study to determine the warning time given to
accident and emergency departments' by ambulance services
before arrival of a critically ill or injured patient,
Cooke and Harrison (1999) addressed the notification and
communication concerns between the ambulance crew and the
hospital.
They found the average alert warning time was seven
minutes [range 1-15 minutes]. Mean time on scene was 22
minutes [range 4-59 minutes]. In trauma patients alone,
the average alert time was seven minutes [range 2-15
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minutes], with an average on scene time of 23 minutes
[range 4-53 minutes]" (Cooke & Harrison, 1999, 340).
The purpose of their study was to address the
emergency department delay issue from another angle: that
of the ambulance provider. When an ambulance is on scene
I
of an emergency, the paramedic must communicate with the
hospital base station. At the base station, there is a
mobile intensive care nurse (MICN) and physician, if
needed. When an ambulance spends too much time on scene
and waits too long to communicate xith the hospital base
station, by the time the ambulance' is prepared to transport
the patient to the hospital, they often do not have enough
time to prepare for the patient's arrival. If the
paramedic could advise the hospital earlier, they could
possibly have a greater chance of being prepared for the
patient. The early communication between the paramedic and
the base hospital would be helpful in reducing an
unprepared emergency department staff for patient arrival,
however, even if the emergency department is not able to
handle the additional patient effectively due to no
available beds, the patient will still occupy the bed of
the ambulance crew until a bed in the emergency department
I
is made available. The purpose of early notification would
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not solve the no-bed-availability problem but it would,
however, reduce unnecessary driving time to a hospital that
the crew believes is open, when in fact it is not.
Patient Abuse of 911 System
No research was found that studied the incidence or
prevalence of patients who use 911 systems to expedite
their care in the emergency department. There are few
studies to determine if patient who accesses 911 will get a
bed in the emergency department faster than if the patient
had walked into the waiting room.
This area must be carefully treaded upon to reduce
i
misunderstanding. Hospital administrators and medical
staff refrain from any action or statement that would
conflict with EMTALA or other governing statutes that
guarantee emergency medical care to all people. A
scenario, therefore, will be narrated in order to create
the picture of the patient who uses 911, the ambulance and
the emergency department for expedited care in order to
reduce their wait in the waiting room. To neglect this
patient type would leave a void in the final patient delay
type that contributes to emergency department delays.
This patient is usually uninsured, but can also be
insured with governmental health care (i.e.: Medicaid).
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There are patients who have private health plans, but they
rarely access 911 for non-emergency reasons. They may be
responsible for pre-authorization from their health plan,
unless their condition is potentially life or limb
threatening.
If health plan patients abuse the emergency system
even once, their plan sends them the bill. Some patients
dispute the bill, the plan denies their dispute, they pay
the bill and never use emergency services unless the
condition is truly close to an emergency. Some dispute the
bill, the plan denies their dispute, they appeal and the
plan pays the emergency bills. Either way, health plan
members experience repercussions for mismanagement of their
health events. What is left is the uninsured patient
population. This population's characteristic use patterns
are the same. They have a health event, they visit the
emergency department, the wait is long, and they are
frustrated. Some wait it out. Others leave—without the
care they sought in the first place. Over time, future
visits to the emergency department train the emergency
department user either to use the emergency department at
less busy times, visit emergency departments in less-busy
areas, not visit the emergency department at all, or call
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911. They know that if they call 911, they will receive
transport to the emergency department and first priority. 
For years, this plan worked for the patient who wanted
emergency department care but did not want to wait.
Finally, there are those patients who present to the 
emergency department, wait awhile,■realize the wait is too
long, leave the emergency department and call 911. An
ambulance arrives, transports them to the emergency
department, they return through the ambulance entrance.
For years, this plan worked for this patient type, as well. 
These days, emergency department staff is becoming a
bit more "hip" to these types of patients who
inappropriately use 911 and emergency department services.
"Frequent flyers" are becoming well known in the 911 and
I
emergency department setting. .Characteristics are little
to no life-threatening distress, poor excuses for the need
for ambulance service, and exaggerated signs that do not
match symptoms of distress.
Triage
Ambulance service providers and hospitals are
communicating more prior to emergency department arrival.
If a patient's symptoms and vital signs are non-indicative
of immediate emergency department bed occupancy, the
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patient is sent to triage. At the hospital, the triage
nurse evaluates the patient. If the triage nurse's
evaluation is similar to the ambulance crew's evaluation,
the patient is sent to the waiting room. This prevents a
bed from being used by someone who does not need it as much
as another patient who is obviously more ill. When the
word or experience of this innovative method of curbing
emergency department misuse gets out, the patient is forced
to devise1 more effective means of reducing wait times in
the emergency department.
Effects on the Ambulance Provider
In many health systems, ambulance service is
considered separate from other forms of medical care.
Throughout history, the ambulance provider has evolved from
a not -so -i glamorous means of moving an injured individual
from the scene of an emergency to a place to receive care.
It is seen now as a fully implemented and functional
department.
Since the early seventies, paramedic ambulance
providers have been able to perform what is considered
advancedlife support (ALS) measures, including cardiac
monitoring, defibrillation, intravenous vein (IV) therapy,
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injected medications, breathing treatments and other life­
saving procedures to "extend the arm of the hospital."
This care, offered in the pre-hospital setting, has been
hindered recently by delays in the emergency department.
Delays in the emergency department are a problem that
affects the hospital as well as the patient. Whether the
fire department or the private ambulance provider provides
the ambulance service in an area, the public realizes the
issues of' emergency department delays. When an ambulance
crew delivers a patient to the emergency department, they
should be able to clear the hospital within ten to fifteen
minutes, by ambulance service standards. Depending upon
the 911 demands in the area, the crew may clear the
hospital sooner.
Ambulance Out-of-Service
There are times when an ambulance is out of service in
the emergency department due to clean up from a call or
lack of supplies. Usually, both of these out-of-service
reasons are quickly resolved—either by the crew, or other
internal support services—allowing the ambulance to once
again be.placed into service.
Ambulance service providers, like many service
organizations, are faced with unique issues that complicate
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or obstruct their ability to provide vital public service.
Among them are arriving at the scene of an emergency in an
efficient, safe and rapid manner; providing high quality
patient care for the sick and injured at the scene of an
emergency (wherever the patient is found); transporting the
patient quickly and safely; handling litigation; and,
hundreds of other standard operational issues.
Structure of Emergency Services
In emergency medicine, time is one of the most
important factors in determining temporary discomfort,
morbidity or mortality. When time- is extended, the patient
is the ultimate victim. When an emergency occurs, the
ambulance, fire department and police are the second
i I
entities on scene able to make a difference in the life of
the victim of an emergency (the first entities are
bystanders). The care that is provided by the paramedics
and ambulance crew should be the highest possible outside
of the hospital setting. Getting to the scene of an
emergency in a timely manner is not at the leisure of the
ambulance provider. There are variations in the
arrangement of paramedic and ambulance service in an area.
Per.California Health & Safety Code (2002), every city
in California must have both paramedic and ambulance
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service accessible via an emergency' access number, 
typically ;911. Paramedic service is considered ALS while 
ambulance ;service is not always ALS and can be basic life
support (BLS). Table 4 lists examples of systems in
effect:
Table 4. Systems of Response
Sample Area Service Provider
Area X Paramedic
Ambulance
Fire Department
Fire Department
Area Y Paramedic
Ambulance
Fire Department 
Private Provider
Area Z Paramedic
Ambulance
Private Provider 
Private Provider
A system in which paramedic service could be separate from
ambulance service is only possible in an area similar to
the above area "Y". In this case, .paramedic service would
be provided by a fire department while a private ambulance
provides BLS ambulance transport. 'The fire department
1 I
would respond on either a fire engine/truck or a paramedic
squad. The ambulance would transport the patient with a
fire paramedic aboard.
The ambulance service is usually the affected service
as a result of emergency department delays. Emergency
department delays affect the ambulance provider more than
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they do the paramedic provider, if the paramedic service is 
provided separate from the ambulance service. But, the
I
paramedic provider can also experience the effects of
emergency department delays if forced to remain in the
emergency department with the ambulance crew because a
patient must be monitored.
Chapter four will discuss further the affects of wait
times on paramedic follow-ups.
' Attempted Solutions
What' are some of the attempts made by hospitals and
pre-hospital care provider to reduce the emergency
department delays or prevent them all together? The most
I
inappropriate method of handling the problem is to avoid
I
it. It is much easier to allow the emergency department
delays to become a way of life in the emergency department,
as opposed to devising innovative ways to reduce the impact
on the ambulance provider. The problem has no simple
solution. Avoidance, however, does not solve the problem
for the ambulance provider who has no choice but to submit
to the lack of available beds. After all, the problem of a
patient on the ambulance crew's gurney is just that: the
crew's problem, and'not the hospital's. While the hospital
38
emergency department has a general 'concern for their 
ability to treat a patient in need of medical evaluation,
their concern becomes diluted when ,the demand for such
evaluation is multiplied many times by their available
space for efficient patient care delivery.
Add More Emergency Department Beds
In the case of emergency department crowding, one
recommended solution is to add more beds. When emergency
departments are expanded, the expansion only means that
there are more beds to fill. In January 1996, the
emergency department of Antelope Valley Hospital (AVH) had
twelve beds. After four years, they more than doubled
their bed capacity to 26. In the Antelope Valley Case
Study discussed later, this expansion has had little effect
on wait times for a bed in the emergency department.
I
Put More Ambulances on the Road
The solution to add more ambulances to a given area
was undertaken by American Medical Response (AMR) Antelope
Valley Division, the ambulance company of this study,
around the same time Antelope Valley Hospital added
additional beds in late 1996. During that period of time,
AMR deployed six ambulances in the Antelope Valley. By
1999, the number had risen to eight. By mid-2001, the
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Antelope Valley division deployed thirteen ambulances to r
cover the area. Still, in April 2001, the emergency
department delays have remained a serious problem. From
the period of September 2000 through April 2001, Antelope
Valley ambulances transported 13,927 times to area
emergency departments. Of the 13,927 911 emergency
department transports, there were 2,058 delays. In all,
12% of the total transports to the emergency department
resulted in a delay. In this example, adding more
ambulances to cover the additional,call volume can make the
ambulances more available to cover>additional calls. At
I
the same time, the ambulances will,continue to experience a
high number of delays. An ambulance provider—public or 
private—can add units to the 911 systems until the delays
virtually disappear. Additional units, while they may
reduce the delays experienced in the emergency department,
the revenue generated would not produce a profit in an
ambulance provider setting due to the provider's limited
ability to collect full usual and customary charges on
every patient. Simply because an ambulance transports a
I
patient, does not equate to revenue, since the payment of
ambulance bills—like most medical bills—are retrospective;
a patient does not pay the bill prior to transport. Like
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an emergency department, the ambulance must transport
everyone—whether or not they can pay. Additionally, the
ambulance, provider is not compensated for responses, only
transports. An ambulance provider can staff an ambulance
for eight hours, the ambulance can respond on ten calls and
only transport six patients. Payment is only collectable
on the transports. Finally, of the six transports, half
will pay the bill, while the others do not pay at all, or
are reimbursed with a governmental discount (i.e.: Medi-Cal
or Medicare).
Early Notification of Saturation
If an emergency department is'notified early enough,
the medical staff can make the appropriate arrangements to
be as ready as possible for the responding ambulance.
I
There are times when the emergency department is saturated
i
(no available beds), yet if they receive early enough
warning of an ambulance enroute with an unstable patient,
they can move less severe patients to other areas of the
emergency department.
In 1999, The Journal of Accident and Emergency
Medicine (Cooke & Harrison, 1999, 340) published an articleI
that studied the early warning of 'accident and emergency 
departments by ambulance services to determine if early
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notification from the ambulance to the emergency department
was possible. They also considered if accessing an open bed
by the time the ambulance arrived at the emergency
department could be increased due to early notification.
Most ambulance crews know within the first five minutes of
rendering care on scene that the patient will be
transported to the emergency department. Most crews spend
between fifteen and twenty minutes on scene before
transport, and approximately ten to twenty minutes
transport time. In the study, the, average alert time was
seven minutes (range 1-15 minutes) ,. Mean time on scene was
22 minutes (range 4-59 minutes). In trauma patients alone,
the average alert time was 7 minutes, range 2-15 minutes,
with an average on-scene time of 23 minutes, range 4-59
minutes. The reason for the extended on-scene time for
trauma patients is typically due to extrication from
vehicles or additional rescue efforts not necessary in non­
trauma responses. There was a potential earlier alert time
averaging 25 minutes [SD 18.6, range 2-59 minutes] if the
alert call was made five minutes after arrival on scene
(340). Emergency departments could be alerted much earlier
by the ambulance service. This would allow staff to be
assembled and preparations to be made. Disadvantages may
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be an increased 'alert rate' and waste of staff time while
awaiting the ambulance arrival" (Cooke & Harrison, 1999,
340) . I
This; study focused on one of many possible methods of
reducing wait times. At the same time, it took a further
step to implement methods of locating a bed in the
emergency department, even when they are not available, by
encouraging the ambulance crews to notify the emergency
department within five minutes of arrival. This gives the
emergency, department an extra 30 to 40 minutes to prepare
for arrival, instead on only five to ten minutes--current
practice. Early notification, however, would only make aI
difference for patients serious enough to receive a bed in
I
the emergency department upon arrival. If the patient is
not serious and is stable—even if the hospital received
early notification from the ambulance—with the emergency
department saturated, the ambulance waits..
Patient Education
One of the most effective methods of reducing
unnecessary demand is to limit the demand. A constant
challenge1 to reducing demand in emergency department use is
the uninsured or Medicaid patient., These patients have
! i
little incentive to use other means of receiving medical
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care, other than the emergency department'. Until laws are
created to prevent or reduce patients from overusing
emergency services, the only other option is cooperation.
St. Paul's Hospital in Vancouver, BC had a problem 
with over! users of emergency department services. Through
a case-management program designed for individual users of
emergency department services in a certain area, emergency
department use was reduced from 616 in 24 users down to 175
over a period of twelve months (Fernandez & Pope, 2000,
1019). Some of the patients visited the emergency
department for services that could otherwise be provided in
a community clinic. Among the users were the homeless,
those seeking drugs, those with complex medical conditions
and social problems. In the study individual care plans
were attempted to no avail. Comprehensive care plans that
involved more than one agency appeared to have the most
effective results. Canada has a universal health system,
where everyone receives governmental health care. Though
the United States does not have a universal health system,
a system such as the used at St. Paul's Hospital would work
in small areas that cooperate with one another, to a degree
similar to that attempted by the Vancouver community.
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Frequent users were identified and referred to the
Difficult Case Management Committee consisting of social
workers, medical director of the emergency department,
director of CQI, a patient care manager, psychiatric nurse,
clinical nurse specialist, family physicians and community
care providers. To be referred to the committee, the user
had to have visited the emergency department several times
over the past year, with a potential for future use. The
committee met once a month for one, hour. At the monthly
meeting, an individual care plan was designed. A patient's 
visits were considered appropriate' if he required resources 
or physician services not readily available in the
community. At the beginning of the study there were 24
patients, 616 visits over 12 months. Over the course of the
study, 1 patient died, 2 moved (1021). By the end of the
I
study, for the period of one year, the patients accounted
for only 175 visits to the emergency department (1023).
The program proved effective because of adherence 
to the care plans. The crucial element was close 
follow-up for each visit. A blanket approach to 
reduce visits has little effect on frequent users 
of emergency department services. For example, 
diversion of non-urgent cases from the ED had no 
effect on frequent users. Educational
interventions have also been unsuccessful. Our 
program focuses on the needs of the patient and 
allows a multi-disciplinary approach (Fernandez &
Pope 2000 1020)
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The study had a small sample size and the period of
the study was relatively short. While the program was
effective in reducing emergency department visits, its
implementation is not practical in■many settings due to the
increased involvement with meetings, case management and
multi-disciplines within the health care access setting.
Changing 'behavior continues to prove to be a complex
problem to solve—or even reduce—when services needed are
perceived to be unavailable in care settings other than the
local emergency department.
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CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS OF ANTELOPE VALLEY
Description of Antelope Val'ley 
The Antelope Valley is a region in the northern-most
part of Los Angeles County. Located approximately sixty
miles north of Metropolitan Los Angeles, forty miles from
the San Fernando Valley, sixty miles east of the Ventura
coast and seventy-five miles from the city of San
Bernardino, the Antelope Valley is' one of the fastest
growing areas in the nation. 1
Largely due to its relatively close proximity to other
urban cities, as well as the affordability of housing on
larger lots, the desert area of the Antelope Valley has
grown to a population of over 472/000 (2000 census data).
Considered an urban area consisting of the two largest
I
cities, Palmdale and Lancaster, the Antelope Valley —while
spread out from other metropolitan areas—is self-sufficient
and otherwise confined from the rest of LA County. SantaI
Clarita is approximately forty miles south of Antelope
I
Valley a'nd lies in the service area of AMR Antelope Valley
Division. Because AMR Antelope Valley Division services
47
ISanta Clarita, it will also be included in the study, but
referred to as the Santa Clarita Valley (SCV).
In the summer of 2000,' the Operations Department of
American Medical Response determined it was time to address
the excessive number of delays the ambulances experienced
over the past year due to no available beds in the
emergency, departments of the Antelope Valley. It appeared
as though, the delays were increasing in number and no
matter how many ambulances were added, the delays seemed to
remhin. Just one year ago (July 1999), the Antelope Valley
Operations deployed eight ambulances in the Antelope Valley
area and three in the Santa Clarita Valley, for a total
number of eleven ambulances. In July 2000, the Antelope
Valley area was staffed with thirteen ambulances while theI
Santa Clarita Valley staffed five, for a total daily
Iambulance deployment of eighteen (up 7 from the year
before)., Ambulances were added every two months at the
I
cost of $80,000 each unit. Over one year, AMR spent nearly
Ione million dollars in ambulances alone. The Antelope
I
Valley area has two hospitals, while the Santa ClaritaI (
Valley has one. Table 5 shows the hospital profiles and
their bed capacity. Antelope Valley Hospital and Lancaster
Community Hospitals were within three miles of each other.
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ITable 5. Hospital Profiles
Hospital Number 
of Beds
ED
Capacity
Specialty
or
Trauma?
Antelope Valley Hospital 350 ' 28 No
Lancaster Community 
Hospital
117 9 No
Henry Mayo Hospital 250 9 No
It was a regular occurrence for both of the Antelope Valley
hospitals to be closed due to no available beds. Since
Henry Mayo Hospital (HMH) was approximately forty-five
minutes away, the only options were either AVH or LCH. It
became apparent to the ambulance provider AMR that
something must be done about the emergency department
delays, since they began to affect their response times to
other calls since the ambulances were waiting for beds in
the emergency department instead of responding to 911
calls. The Los Angeles County Department of Health Services
911 contract specified that AMR must arrive on scene within
eight minutes fifty-nine seconds (0:8:59). There are 
approved!exceptions to the 8:59 clock that allow certain 
responses to be extracted from the, total responses. Among
I
the exceptions:
I
• Road construction
• Train passing in the path of travel
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• Following a responding fire unit (heading to the same
call)
• Adverse weather (wind, rain)
When these exceptions are used, the response time is
not used against the responding unit for the call. The
rationale is these conditions are no fault of the
responding ambulance provider. Emergency department delays
are no fault of the responding ambulance provider's, yet
they are.not considered exceptions, unless the responding
unit is coming directly from the emergency department, so
I
whether the ambulance just cleared the emergency department
I
and was dispatched holds no bearing on being able to use
i
emergency department delays as an 'exception for not making
i
the contracted response time. 1
i
I
Data Sources and Definitions
Over a period of seven months data was collected from the
I
computer automated dispatching system (CAD) AMR uses for
I
dispatching their ambulances to emergency and non-emergency
medical .requests for service. The CAD is also used by
I
other public safety agencies like the police and fire
departments. The CAD tracks most information such as:
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• time of call,
• day Of call,
• time' call received,
• time, ambulance dispatched,
• time' ambulance arrives on scene,
• how long the unit is on scene,
• time the unit transports to the hospital,
• time the unit arrives at the hospital,
• whether the unit calls in an emergency department
delay,
• time the emergency department delay begins and ends,
and
• time the unit clears the hospital.
While the CAD system produced regular management reports
on productivity, workload, other business statistics, it
was decided that special analyses were needed to answer
questions about ER delays due specifically to the lack of
available emergency beds at local hospitals.
Specifically, the purpose of the data analysis was to
answer the following questions:
I
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• What are the total and average numbers of emergency
department delays due to no bed availability, by
month, day of week, and by time of day?
• What are the total and average times expended for
emergency department delays due to no bed
availability, by month, day of week, and by time of.
day?
• What are the total and average numbers of emergency
department delays due to no bed availability, by
hospital?
• What are the total and average times expended for
emergency department delays due to no bed
availability, by hospital?
Collection Period and Scope
The data were collected over the period of seven
months (September 2000 through April 2001).
Bed. unavailability was based upon the time interval
between when an ambulance unit arrived at the hospital and
was advised by the emergency department charge nurse (or 
equivalent) that there were "no beds available." until the
unit was released for service.
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In normal operations the crew,was obligated to notify
dispatch immediately upon notification that they would be
delayed due to no beds being available. The dispatcher
entered the reason for the delay into the CAD and
automatically stamped it with a start time. After the crew
cleared from the emergency department, they would advise
dispatch and the emergency department delay clock would
stop. The code that indicated a bed was not available was
used to select cases from the data set that qualified as
"bed availability related delays."
The delay codes were extracted from the CAD at the end
of September, October and November of 2000 and January,
February, March and April of 2001. Delays for December
were excluded from the study due to a change in operating
computer systems on December 10, 2000. If the numbers forI
December were included, there woul'd have been ten days of 
information missing from the final month's calculations.
Non-emergency medical transports were not included in
I
the analysis because they are considered a non-contractual
obligation for pre-hospital care with the county contract.
While AMR provides non-emergency medical transportation
services, a public provider would not. Including these
transports would inaccurately depict the true significance
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Iof emergency department delays as they are related to the
911 System, because non-emergency calls are not contracted.
Results
Daily Delays
The data set contained delay data for 208 days. Over 
these days, 2,066 delays occurred representing a total of 
1,213 hours of delay three (Table 6). The average number 
of delays per day was 9.9, ranging from a low of one per 
day to a high of thirty.
Table 6. Total Delays per Day, Total Daily 
'Delay Time and Mean Daily Delay Time
Delays Minutes of Delay per Day
Minimums 208 1 208
Maximums 1 22
Sums 33 1,479
Means 2, 066 72,782
Std. Deviations 9.93 349.91
5.953 247.785
The daily delay time ranged from a low of 22 minutes
per day to a high of 1,479 minutes—the equivalent of 24
hours—per day. The average minutes of delay per day was
349.9 or approximately 6 hours per day. What this means is
that six hours out of every day, units were unable to
respond to emergency calls in the area, increasing the 
chances o'f being late on subsequent emergency responses.
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Delays as,a Percent of Transports
The 2,066 delays during this period represent 14.8
percent of a total of approximately 13,927 transports of
patient that occurred. The County Department of Health
Services EMS Division allows for ten percent (10%) of total
responses to be out of compliance.
For the first three months of the study (September,
I
October, November), the average number of delays each month
Was only 199. The reason for the increase was the computer1 I
program transfer, which occurred in December. Prior to the
CAD upgrade, there were calls not coded consistently with
all emergency department delay codes. After the upgrade,
all delays were captured, since all dispatchers were
entering the same codes into the CAD.
Lengths of Delay
Lengths of delays contributed'significantly to the
availability of an ambulance for response in an area. The
average length of delays was thirty-five minutes (Table 7).
Table 7. Average Length of Delays
Number of Delays 2066
'Minimum Minutes 0
Maximum Minutes 229
Total Minutes 72782.13
Mean Minutes per 
Delay
35.23
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IThis average delay of thirty-five minutes created an
extended time to become available from arrival to the ED
until clearance from the ED. This time (known as the turn
time) represents from the time of arrival to the hospital
with a patient to the time the patient leaves the ambulance
crew's gurney. It is thirteen minutes longer than it
should normally take to transfer the care of a patient.
When an ambulance crew arrives at the hospital, completes
transfer of the patient, paperwork, clean up and prepares
for the next response, typically twenty minutes pass.
Thirty-five minutes, when compounded with additional' I
waiting crews, can have a disparate impact on the crew's
J ability to respond immediately to (the next request for
help.
i
Delays by Month
For the seven months of data analyzed, the average
I
number of delays per month was 295 with a total delay time
of 1.213 hours. Monthly delays ranged from 176 to 426 per
month. Transports to the emergency department that were
considered delays were any transports that resulted in an
inability to immediately receive direction to a bed for the
patient. The total amount of delay time per month ranged
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from 5,023 minutes per month to a maximum of 15,801 minutes
per month. Monthly delays and delay lengths for the period
of the study indicated a considerably higher number of
delays than previously thought (Table 8). For the period
of seven months, the increased number of minutes indicated
a significant complication in the delivery of care for the
pre-hospital patient.
Table 8. Monthly Delays and Delay Length
Minutes of Delay Number of 
Delays
Number of 
Months
7 7
Totals 72,782.13 2,066
Minimums 5,022.77 176
Maximums 15,800.87 426
Means 10,397.4 295.1
Std.
Deviations
4,176.781 96.712
Not only was consideration of the total number of
delays, as well as delay lengths analyzed, it became
important to evaluate the number of delays each month to 
determine if there was a certain month that experienced 
more delays than another month. Assuming that every month
would render the same types of delays, both in length as
well as number, inaccurate results would have produced,
I
directly affecting the data.
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The Operations department at American Medical Response
wanted to,determine the total number of delays that
occurred each month. Additionally, the need to visualize
the numbef of delays in comparison with the other months of
the study, proved to be an important component of
consideration. The question that needed to be answered
was: Do delays happen all the time, or during a certain
month? Most medical events are seasonal, meaning that
during certain seasons, there is an increase in medical
events. In the cas.e of the ambulance provider, medical
events could either be life-threatening (immediate) or
chronic in nature. Ambulance providers should not be
summoned to the chronic or non-life-threatening medical
events, though they typically are requested to respond.
Figure 1 displays the number of delays for each month and
how they compared to other months in the study. Even
though data collection improved in January 2001, the delays
still increased. Data was collected differently in
September, October and November 2000. There was a computer
upgrade halfway through December 2000. Figure 1 displays
the improved collection while also tracking true delays.
Clearly, a trend is visible from the Figure 1 profile.
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Figure 1. Count of Delays by Month Incurred
Clearly, the number of delays increased from the time
the study began (September 2000) until the time the data
collection ended (April 2001). Figure 1 lists the total
minutes of delay. Note the similar appearance of the bar
in each, figure, suggesting that t,he higher number of
1
delays, the longer the number of minutes delayed for a
specified month.
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Figure 2. Total Minutes of Delay by Month
From September 2000 through April 2001, average
I
delays, as well as delay range, increased steadily. While
the average delay time for the seven months (34 minutes)
appears ;to not be an issue, for every minute the ambulance
was not'available to respond to a 911 call, the risk of a
patient not receiving immediate care increases.
In1 June 2002, the Los Angeles Times featured a front­
page editorial on emergency department delays entitled:
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"Crowded ERs Put patients on Hold"' (Ornstein 2002 A29) .
s.
Regarding Los Angeles City Fire Department Paramedic
ambulances being held in the emergency department with no
beds, Dr. Mark Eckstein was quoted as saying "the
paramedics by default become ER nurses or part of the
hospitals' staff" (LA Times). Eckstein is the medical
director'for Los Angeles City Fire' Department and advocate
for pre-hospital staff. The multi-paged article in the Los
Angeles Times profiled the emergency department delay
problem from the north Los Angeles County (Antelope
Valley), down through Central and South Los Angeles. The
potential for an otherwise available ambulance not being
able to respond represented a liability for the ambulance
I
provider, intensified by their inability to obtain an
exemption for such a delay type.
Average Time of Delays per Month
As reported, the average delay time per episode of
delay is 35 minutes. Average trip delays by month have
been slowly increasing, from 28.5 minutes per delay in
September 2000 to 37.8 minutes in April 2001. From
September 2000 through April 2001, there the Antelope
Valley experienced 2,066 delays ranging from .00 minutes to
1
228.52 minutes (Table 9) :
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Table 9. Means, Standard Deviations, 
Minimums and Maximums of Minutes 
of Delay per Month
Month Delays Mean
Minutes
Std.
Deviations
Minimum
Minutes
Maximum
Minutes
September ' 176 28.5 11.5071 7.70 , 76.37
October ; 234 31.9 ' 17.0027 "9.27 117.38
November 196 32.5 18.7042 8.80 178.53
January ’ 300 36.2 20.4325 .02 119.55
February 426 37.1 19.0727 .08 166.68
March 388 36.6 21.2089 .00 228.52
April 346 37.8 19.4416 .02 155.55
Totals 2066 35.2 19.1761 .00 228.52
From September 2000 through April 2001, minutes ofI
delays increased steadily (Figure 3). Given this
I
continually upward path, the trend,appears to be in line
with even' more increased number of delays with extended
number of minutes required to handle the delays. What is
important' to remember is that Figure 3 is similar to Figure
2 in that both figures mimic an upward trend of both
increased number of delays, as well as increased delay
times. This trend, given its displayed pattern will only
increase in both frequency of delays as well as length of
delays. Both Table 9, as well as Figure 3 illustrate the
immediate state of urgency in correcting and reducing
i
emergency department delays.
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Figure 3. Mean Delay Times and 
95% Confidence Intervals by Month
The lines are nearly identical, which suggests a grim trend
that will continue over time given an unchanged state of
supply and demand similar to that exhibited in this study.
Table 10 lists the total number of paramedic follow ups,
total number of 911 calls for the period of the study and
the percent of transports by each month. From September
through the end of the study (April 2001), the percent of
delays increased (from 9.1% to 17.5%). In February 2001,
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delayed emergency department transports increased to a
percentage of 21.6%.
Table 10. Percent of Delays with Paramedic Follow up, 
Total 911 Calls and Percent of Transports Delayed by Month
Month Total
Paramedic,
Follow-Up
■ Percent 
of Delays 
With
Paramedic
Follow-Up
Total
Delays
Each
Month
Total 911
ED
Transports
Percent of
ED
Transports 
That are 
Delayed
September 93 4.9 172 1,807 9.1
October 77 3.7 229 1,895 11.0
November 84 4.9 196 1,702 11.5
★ January 895 47.8 300 ' 1, 874 16.0
February 829 42.0 426 1,974 21.6
March 860 35.6 388 2,419 16.0
April 788 39.8 347- 1,980 17.5
Totals 3, 626 2,058 13,651
*In January 2001, there was s CAD1 (computer automated
dispatching) upgrade. This upgrade allowed information
to be collected more accurately due to a standard code
extraction, as opposed to codes that were entered
differently, and therefore not tracked.
What were the lengths of time an ambulance waits in
the emergency department for a bed for their patient? The
hospitals had suggested that the tracked data grouped
shorter delays into the total number of delays, making the
total number of delays at their facility seem larger than
they truly were.
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Delay lengths were stratified into four separate
categories.
1. Number of delays less than ten minutes
2. Number of delays greater than 1 ten minutes
3. Number of delays between thirty and fifty nine minutes
4. Number of delays greater than one hour
The delay detail is profiled in Table 11.
Table 11. Percentages of Cases Delayed by Month
1
Months
Time Interval
00-09 10-29 30-59 60+ Totals N
January , 4.0% 40.3 42.7 13.0 100.0% 300
February 0.7% 37.8 50.9 10.6 100.0% 426
March 0.8% 41.0 49.0 9.3 100.0% 388
April 1.4% 36.7 50.6 11.3 100.0% 346
September 0.6% 61.9 35.8 , 1.7 100.0% 176
October 0.4% 56.8 36.3 ' 6.4 100.0% 234
November' 1.0% 51.0 42.3' 5.6 100.0% 196
Totals 1.3% 44.0 45.5' 9.1 100.0% 2066
For the four categories (<10 min., 10-29 min., 30 -59
min., >60 min.), percentages each category represented for
I
each month were calculated. Total number of delays that
were less than ten minutes were only 28, representing one
percent of the delays for the seven months studied. Such
low numbers and percentages of total delays will most
likely result in a modified tracking of future delays to
include' only those delays that are greater than thirty
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minutes. Tracking delays of just any number would produce
inaccurate results.
The total number of delays that were greater than ten
minutes (10 - 29 minutes) was 942, representing 48% of the
total delays for the seven months studied. Total number of
delays between thirty and fifty-nine minutes were 905, or
. 1
42% of the total delays for the seven months studied.
Finally, the last category of delay was of those
greater than one hour. Delays greater than one hour
totaled 183, or 8% of the total number of delays for the
I
seven months studied (Table 11). While the delays greater
than one. hour were the second to the lowest category of
total delays, the problem that they represent could be
detrimental to the system, considering the length of time
it takes to return an ambulance back into'service.
Considering the above chart, an operator of pre­
hospital care medical services would want to pay
particularly close attention to delays between ten and
sixty minutes. All delays in the emergency department have
the potential to contribute to a .subsequent delay in
response to another request for service, though delays
between ten and sixty minutes are the most common.
Delays by day of week are profiled in figure 4:
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Day of Week
Figure 4. Count of Delays by Day of Week
The average number of delays that occur on a given day of
I
the week (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, etc.) and their
i
variations reflect the experiences of hospitals' emergency
room demand. Figure 5 profiles the total number of delays
throughout the course of a week for the entire period of
the study: '
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Monday Wednesday Friday
Day of Week ,
Figure 5. Means and 95% Confidence Intervals for 
Minutes of Delays by Day of Week
The longest delays occur in the following descending
order: Tuesday, Sunday, Thursday, Monday, Wednesday,
Saturday, and Friday (Figure 5). When the total number of
delays is considered, Tuesday, Monday and Wednesday are the
days with the highest number of delays. When the length of
delays is considered, Tuesday, Sunday and Thursday
I
experience the longest delays, as opposed to the greatest
number of total delays. What is suggested is that just
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because there are delays, does not 'mean that the number of
delays correspond to length of delays. The longest delays,
occur with the greatest number of delays on Monday, Tuesday
and Wednesday of every week (Table 12):
Table 12. Total Minutes of Delays, Minimums, Maximums, 
Means, and Standard Deviations by Day of Week
Day of ,
Week
Number
of
Delays
Total 
Minutes 
of Delay
Minimums Maximums Mean
Times
Std.
Deviation
Sunday 237 8685.02 . 02 116.70 36.6 18.711
Monday 329 11807.37 1.07 178.53 35.9 20.587
Tuesday 368 14062.35 . 0(P 228.52 38.2 23.942
Wednesday 299 10025.92 . 03 220.25 33.5 19.574
Thursday 284 9759.18 1.27 155.55 34.4 16.120
Friday 305 10355.90 . 08 107.55 34.0 15.681
Saturday 244 8086.40 . 03 119.55 33.1 15.507
Total 2066 72782.13 .00 ■ 228.52 35.2 19.176
While the greatest number of delays occur on Tuesday,
Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, Saturday, Friday, Sunday
greatest to smallest), the average length of delay is
close, but not concurrent, with the days that experience
the greatest number of delays.
Viewing the average delay times for each day in each
month studied revealed an otherwise implicit characteristic
of the delays. Sunday is the day of the week every month
with the least amount of delays. Sunday has the second
longest average delay time—just after Tuesday. The average
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delay time on Sunday is the second longest (0:35), just
behind Tuesday (0:36).
Determining any significance in the day of week for
each delay was one of the most important components of the
study. Even if the hospital is not able to address the 
emergency department delays in their facility, the 
ambulance provider can increase staffing on the days that
emergency department delays are the highest. In order to
determine a trend, the emergency department delays for all
days were totaled and graphed. Month after month, the
trend remained similar, with the emergency department
delays from highest to lowest on the following days:
Tuesday, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, Saturday, Friday,
Sunday. To determine if the number of emergency department
delays were greater on certain days of the week, the total
number of delays on each day of the week were graphed.
Contrary to preliminary theories, which proposed Friday and
Saturday as the busiest time for emergency department
delays, Tuesday, Monday and Wednesday consistently
experienced the most number of delays.
Contrary to many public safety agencies' assessment of
delays which assumes emergency department delays will
increase on the weekends, the Antelope Valley study
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revealed that delays occur most often on Tuesday, thenl
Monday, then Wednesday, through the end of the week until
the weekend, where the delays occur least often. With this
revelation, increased staffing of ambulances and emergency
departments should occur during these peak times and days
to be able to offset the historical influx of patients
I
during these times. >
Delays by Time of Day
Is there a specific time of day that delays occur more
often? This question was important in order to determine
if ambulance deployment could be modified in such a way to
minimize the number that would be occupied in the emergency 
department during saturation. Som^ staff members with AMR 
assumed their own times and compared them to the times
tracked in the study. The majority of the assumed times
were in the morning and evenings, because of rush hour
driving to and from work, school and other common places of
travel. The time of day that delays are the most prevalent
were screened and graphed in Figure 6. Figure 6 represents
delays only and not total number of transports to the ED.
While the total number of minutes were common around
thirty-five minutes, there were spikes in delayed minutes.
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Figure 6. Means and 95% Confidence Intervals for Delay 
Times by Time of Arrival at Emergency Department
The greatest number of delays occurs between 12PM and
8PM each day. Time of day is relative to the number of
delays that occur during the course of a day. From 12AM,
with a total number of delays of 44, the total number of
delays starts to reduce in number, through 7AM, when they
again begin increasing in frequency. From 7AM, the delay
totals steadily climb until 2PM where the delay totals peak
at 154. This continues through 8PM (113 delays). After
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8PM, the numbers reduce, but remain steady through
midnight.. While they are less than the triple digit peak
time of 2PM (Table 13), the number,of delays during this
period (1,525), remain a potential problem for an ambulance 
requested to respond on an emergency request for service.
Table 13. Frequency Distribution, Percentages, and 
Cumulative Percentages of Delays by Arrival Hours
Time of 
Arrival
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percent
12 PM 52 2.5% 2.5%
1 AM 36 1.7 4.3
2 AM 22 1.1 5.3
3 AM 22 1.1 6.4
4 AM 10 ■ .5 6.9
5 AM 9 .4 7.3
6 AM 2 . 1 7.4
7 AM 15 1 . 7 8.1
8 AM 23 1.1 9.2
9 AM ' 30 1.5 10.7
10 AM 84 4.1 14.8
11 AM 115 '5.6 20.3
Noon 131 6.3 26.7
1 PM 140 6.8 33.4
2 PM 175 ,8.5 41.9
3 PM 163 7.9 49.8
4 PM 137 6.6 56.4
5 PM 159 7.7 64.1
6 PM 182 8.8 72.9
7 PM 165 8.0 80.9
8 PM 130 6.3 87.2
9 PM 102 4.9 92.2
10 PM 83 ,4.0 96.2
11 PM 79 i3.8 100.0%
Total 2066 100.0%
I
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The period from midnight to ten AM experienced the
least amount of delays. From 10AM until 7PM, the delays in 
the emergency department seemed to1 be constant. It would 
appear to be that during this period of time (from 10AM -
7PM) ambulance deployment should be the highest compared to
any other time of day. It would be in this time period
that the greatest number of ambulances should be on the air 
and ready for response, due to the, regular delays
experienced in the emergency department at these times.
The period of 10AM to 7PM should be staffed most days and
to refine the days, deployment should be at its highest
during those hours and on Monday, .Tuesday, Wednesday and
Thursday—since the highest number .of delays have occurred
during these times.
Delays by Hospital
In an effort to further determine delays versus total
transports to each hospital emergency department, total
number of delays were computed as a percentage of total
itransports. Table 14 lists the total number of transports,
total number of delays and the corresponding percentage:
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Table 14, Number of Delays, Number of Transports, and 
Percent of Transports Delayed by Hospital
ED Transports
1
% of All 
Transports
Delays % of
All
Delay
Delays as 
% of
Transport
s
AVH 8,094 58.1 1, 591 77.0 19.7
HMH 3, 565 25.6 75 . 3.6 2.1
LCH 2,268 16.3 397 19.2 17.5
Total 13,927 100.0 2,066 100.0 14.8
Even though AVH transports over 58% of all emergency
department admissions, LCH has the,longest delays (Table
15). In other words, LCH receives less transports, due to
their smaller bed capacity, though making the bed available
takes more time.
Table 15. Total Minutes of Delay, Percent of 
all Minutes, Means, Standard Deviations, 
Minimums and Maximums by Hospital
Hospita
1
Total
Minutes
Delay
Percent 
of All 
Minutes
Mean
Delays
St.Dev. Minimum Maximu
m
AVH 53,497 73.5 33.6 16.6 0.0 220.3
HMH 2, 324 3.2 31.0 14.6 9.6 86.1
KP 85 0.1 28.5 5.1 22.8 32.6
LCH 16,876 23.2 42.5 2 6.4 0.1 228.5
Total 72,782 100.0 35.2 19.2 0.0 228.5
I
The preceding
Tables 14 and
delays at HMH
stratification of delays provided details.
15 proved what AMR proposed, which was that
in Santa Clarita were not an issue of concern
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(2%), compared to the Antelope Valley, where nearly twenty
percent of all transports resulted in a delay. The
attention to the emergency department delay problem
remained within the Antelope Valley, as opposed to the
entire service division of the Lancaster AMR Operation.
Table 16 lists the percentage of delays stratified to
determine if the delays are just delayed (any delay; less
than thirty minutes) or for any delay that is extended
(greater than thirty minutes):
Table 16. Percentages of Delays Less Than or 
Equal to Thirty Minutes and Greater 
than Thirty Minutes by Hospital
Hospital
Delays
Totals Delays<=30 Minutes > 30 Minutes
AVH 50.2% 49.8% 100.0% 1591 ■
HMH 58.7% 41.3% 100.0% 75
KP 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 3
LCH 41.1% 58.9% 100.0% 397
Totals 48.7% 51.3% 100.0% 2066
While the majority of the delays were greater.than
thirty minutes (>30 min.), the delays greater than one hour
(>1 hr.), as well as those less than thirty minutes (<30
min.) all contributed to a delay or potential delay of the
otherwise available ambulance responding to a 911 request
for service.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AN EVALUATION OF NORTH
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Challenges to the Study
Attaining full cooperation with participating agencies 
remained a challenge to the Antelope Valley case study
results. Among the agencies participating were Lancaster
Community Hospital, Antelope Valley Hospitals, and the
Department of Health Services. By not siding with the
hospitals or the fire department and ambulance provider,
DHS assumed a neutral role.
Hospital Responsibility
It was with the hospitals that the most challenging
I
' episodes of responsibility were experienced. The topic 
itself (delays in the emergency department) instantlyI
placed the hospital management into a defensive mode. The
task force knew that the emergency department was the
bottleneck to the rest of the hospital, where patients
arrived both by appointment, walk-in and via ambulance.
This premise was agreed upon early in the process. When 
speculation about extended delays were transformed into 
numerical data from the ambulance provider, and supported
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through the ALS pre-hospital care provider (the fire
department) reporting, the two hospitals moved into a
defense mode, attempting to explain the reasons there are
delays and that nothing could be done to correct them.
Their defensive stance complicated, the efforts to
analytically assess the delays and collectively arrive at a
common solution.
In the beginning of the study, the larger hospital
(AVH) assumed a more active role in the solution process.
The hospital had a paramedic liaison nurse (PLN) who
effectively conveyed the data to his management team and
arrived at the meetings with positive feedback to
brainstorm methods of reducing delays.
I
LCH—the smaller hospital—became defensive and did not
participate in the meetings regularly. Within one year, the
roles were reversed. The AVH PLN1 was hired by LA County
Fire Department; AVH got a new PLN and voluntarily dropped
their base station status. LCH got a new emergency
department Director and CEO and regularly attended the
meetings. In early 2002, AVH held a press conference and
diverted the attention away from their emergency
department. They publicly asserted that as the larger
hospital, they received more patients then LCH and this
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contributed to their inability to effectively manage the 
extra patient load. They further made a standard practice 
of literally closing their doors to internal crisis. In
I 1 '
this mode, pre-hospital care providers would have to
transport one patient to LCH, two to AVH. Because AVH
asserted that the ambulances automatically bypassed LCH for
AVH because of AVH's active efforts to remove the patient
from the ambulance gurney, AVH would take increasingly 
longer to, downgrade from emergency department saturation.
This method worked effectively for AVH and DHS made the
method a protocol under review through 2002.
Hospital Versus 
Pre-Hospital
Even before the emergency department delay task force,
pre-hospital care providers and emergency department staff
experienced a challenge to authority. Largely due to the
"rescue" mentality among pre-hospital care providers and
the fire department, the hospital staff remained offensive
to certain members of the pre-hospital care community.
Once the emergency department delays were brought to the
attention of the emergency department management, the line
staff of the emergency department!went into defense mode.I
With an already tense relationship (at times), this
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suggestion of responsibility for the delays belonging to
the emergency department created an increased resistance to
methods that were produced from the meetings. One of the
methods the emergency department would implement was to
have the ambulance crew's patient evaluated within five
minutes of arrival in the emergency department. This
evaluation consisted of an initial report to an emergency
department nurse. The crew would also advise the emergency
department staff of the level of units available to run
calls at that time. If the crew stated, "we are at a level
two," that meant that there were two other ambulances
available to respond to 911 requests for service. Advising
the evaluating nurse of the level .was intended,
theoretically, to increase or decrease the urgency of
transferring the patient to the hospital's bed. This plan
did nothing short of further emphasizing the already
perceived "rescue" mentality of the pre-hospital personnel,
suggesting that their ability to respond to a call was more
important than the hospital's ability to handle excessive
patient flow. This advising was informally discontinued 
due to tihe response from the emergency department staff.
Cooperation among the different agencies remained
among the most compelling improvements to emerge from the
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emergency department delay project. Traditionally 
executing their duties independent of one another, the 
ambulance provider, fire department, department of health
services, EMS agency and the local,'hospitals voluntarily
contributed to accomplish a common goal. Contrary to pre­
conceived reservations prevalent within each organization,
each agency brought something unique and useful to the
meetings:
Reluctance to Address Problem
The. reluctance to address the true problem of
emergency department delays was largely due to the
hospital's normal methods of evaluating, treating and
releasing patients. Throughout history, they did it the
same way. While delays in the emergency department were a
I
formality of the system, they did not last long (from the 
perspective of the hospital staff). With the exception of
ambulance gurneys lined in the hallway, patient complaints
about waits or pre-hospital care providers bringing the
problem to the attention of hospital management, the
hospital had no way of knowing that the delays impacted the
ambulance provider; nor were they aware of the degree.
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This unknown became one of the many motivating factors that
guided the study.
Personality Conflicts
Among many duties, fire fighters fight fires, respond
to rescues and perform inspections to ensure the safety of
structures and state fire standards. Nurses comfort and
evaluate patients. Ambulance providers perform the duties
of comfort and evaluation of patients, complemented with
the auraiof fast driving, lights, sirens and rescues. The
combination of these varying personalities created an ever-
changing conflict during task force meetings. The leaders
of the meetings (Assistant Chief with LA County Fire
Department and the Assistant Director of the EMS Agency)
were forced to maintain an objective role during the
process, while interjecting their own experiences relative
to the discussion at hand. At times, certain members of the
team implemented sarcasm and passive resistance methods, in
order to, emphasize personal or professional disagreement
with certain members or topics of discussion. These
tactics proved to be counter-productive and were even
commented on in one meeting. Department heads were evenI
Icontacted on more than one occasion.
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Public Versus Private Agencies
The public agencies were:
• Los Angeles County Fire Department
• Department of Health Services
• EMS Agency
• Office of District 5 Supervisor Mike Antonovich 
The private agencies were:
• Antelope Valley Hospital
• Lancaster Community Hospital
• American Medical Response
Public and private interests are items of discussion
in many groups. They are weighted during requests for
proposals and even voted upon initiatives during elections.
The systems that offer the most benefit to the most people
i
remains the preferred unit of measurement to determineI
efficacy of public or private service or goods. The
delivery of pre-hospital care and ambulance service
continues to be a debatable subject of should the public or
private provider do the job? In LA County (and other parts 
of the country, there is a joint effort between the fire
department and the ambulance proyider. The fire department 
provides the ALS care while the ambulance provides the BLS
care and the ambulance transportation. The question was
raised: whose responsibility is it to ensure that patients
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receive medical care? The answer was not the government.
Contrary to public perception, the government is not
charged with ensuring medical care for all. The hospitals,
fire departments and contracted private providers are
obligated to provide medical care to all—regardless of
their ability to pay. However, if there are no hospitals
in an area, or if medical care is needed, the public is
burdened with attaining such care. Once it was determined
that the government (federal, state or county) was not
obligated to bring medical services to those who need it,
the focus of public versus private became less of an issue.
The public sector confirmed their'position of providing for
' Ithe good of the people (even though they were not
constitutionally obligated to do so, while the private
providers were obligated to provide care to all—due to
EMTALA and all contractors of Medicare and Medicaid
programs. If nothing else, both the public and private
providers learned more about the other side of care
providers' duties and roles in the communities that it
serves. This benefit was extra and certainly not a planned
part of the process. Considering initially different
representatives would attend the meeting each month,
cooperation became an asset to the teams.
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Data Collection ,and Analysis
i
Data collection and analysis remained among the most
continually evolving aspects of the study. The initial
data to be collected started with time of day, day of week
and call type and was scheduled to be tracked for only
three months: September, October and November 2000. This
I
initial tracking proved to be limited in determining true
I
trends that would appear over time,, and needed to be
expanded to include at least six months and other more
compelling constructs such as length of delay, length of
delay for each day of the week, compared delays over time
for the half year and others. The question to be answered
was when do delays occur and are there any reasons for
delays that can be eliminated through identification of
factors to which the ambulance provider held some control?
Through the monthly meetings, via input from each
contributing agency involved, data collection by the
ambulance provider was modified to reflect areas of
relevance to the study of wait times as a whole. Once the
task force agreed upon data, changes were made to the
report that reflected additional tracking of trends and
types. 1
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Acceptable Definitions
Just what is considered a delay in the emergency
department? How much time is expected to pass during a
normal transfer of care scenario, in which an ambulance
crew would arrive at the emergency department, transfer the 
patient from the ambulance gurney to the hospital's, give
the patient report, prepare the ambulance for the next call
and leave the hospital ready for the next response? The
national company standard (American Medical Response) is
between twenty and twenty two minutes. This standard is
based upon the crew arriving at the emergency department
and no one from the emergency department advising that
1 \
there are no beds available. For the purpose of the study,
Ithe initial tracking of delays was, the point when the crew
1 I
arrives in the emergency department and the emergency
department staff advises "no bed availability." At this
point, the clock would begin ticking. After the patient
was transferred to the hospital's gurney, the crew was
■supposed to advise dispatch that they are "10-98"
(available, but still at the facility). Once they are
available and on the air ready to respond, they would beii
"10-98, 10-8." If the crew failed to advise dispatch when
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they were 10-98, the delay clock continued to run,
extending the delay an average of ten extra minutes,
depending upon the length of time it took for them to
complete their call after the patient had been transferred.
It was not until May 2002 that this question was raised by
the EMS department. The data collected prior to this
streamline in tracking the delays all contained potentially
extended delay times. After May 2002,' the crews were
specifically required to advise dispatch when the patient
left their gurney under a delayed bed scenario.
To further narrow the potential of losing data to
crews not advising when they are delayed with no beds,
"turn times" were later tracked for all calls. Turn times
are the hospital departure time (10-98, 10-8) minus the
arrival time (10-10 time). For example, if a crew arrived
at 21:15 and left the hospital at22:30, the turn time
would be 1 hour, fifteen minutes (01:15). Compensating for
the times that are acceptable or standard turn times (20 to
22 minutes), delays of greater than twenty minutes were
tracked only. A call was not considered a delay unless the
delay was greater than twenty minutes (>20 min.). Delays
are now tracked in the following levels:
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• >20 minutes
• 30 minutes to 59 minutes
• 1 hour or greater
While this latter modification to the criteria that
defined delays and turn times reduced the total number of 
delays overall, it increased the range of the delays as
well as the average length of the delays. Since these 
modifications were implemented after the initial seven-
month project, the data is not included past April 2001.
These modifications are anticipated to effectively track 
true delays and their effects on the ambulance provider, as
I
well reduce the potential for dispute when data is brought
to the attention of the hospital management. It also
increases the validity of the data by using methods that
have been utilized over time, and 'collectively enhanced,
modified or completely eliminated by the emergency
department delay task force.
I
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CHAPTER FIVE
: A PLAN OF ACTION FOR
REDUCING DELAYS
Delays in the emergency department due to bed
shortages presents as an unsolvable problem in its current
form. The problem is a direct one: No beds equal emergency
department delays. The solution is not as simple, since
bed availability is rarely reparable without adding more
beds to the emergency department, ICU and hospital as a
whole. If more beds are added, then those too will
possibly be filled.
Ambulance Diversions
"Over four years, diversion increased 453% [n=718 in
1986 versus3,973 in 1989]" (Redelmeier 1994). Diversion to
other local hospitals proves to be a temporary solution for
the inevitable: ED saturation (Redelmeier 1994).
Controlling Supply 
and Demand
Considering supply and demand drives the bed shortage
issue, the only viable solution is to reduce the demand.
In the Antelope Valley study, it was determined that one of
the most significant reductions in emergency department
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delays would be that of upstream methods. If patients
could use an alternative source for access to care, the
emergency’ department would be less taxed. To facilitate
the need for health insurance for those who would qualify,
AMR became an enrollment entity (EE) with the California
State Healthy Families Program. Attaining this EE status
allowed AMR to work with the county and state to reduce the
number of uninsured users of 911 services. Having health
insurance would promote the insured to use a primary care
physician or urgent care instead of the emergency
department.
Emergency Department User Education
The Los Angeles County Department of Health Services
composed.a pamphlet to be distributed to the public at
health fairs and community events. The pamphlet outlined
the important question of what is a true emergency and
where does one go to get care if they experience a non-
emergent medical condition. The LA County Fire Department
also worked with AMR to create a’pamphlet to be distributed
on 911 .responses. The pamphlet would be given to any
patient who called 911 and could have accessed medical care
in an alternative setting such as an urgent care or clinic.
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The difference between LA County DHS' pamphlet and LA
County Fire and AMR's is the fire department and AMR have
the ability to give the material to the user immediately
upon access to the 911 system, while DHS would hopefully
prevent the 911 call in the first place. Methods to reduce
demand have been attempted in most hospital settings across
the nation and even the world. The ones that work the best
are those that virtually change the thinking of the patient
in order to modify the behavior and subsequently reduce
emergency department use.
Hospitals have exhausted their expendable resources
and ideas to reduce emergency department delays. However,
when hospital administration accepts that emergency
department delays are a way of life for the ailing patient,
efforts to defeat the delay crisis will have failed.
I
Though delays present as an unsolvable problem in its
current form, hospital administration must never accept the
problem as a formality of the system. One of the jobs of a
health educator is to convince people to stop smoking
cigarettes. Some people stop, others continue. Whatever
the outcome, the health educator never ceases the message.
Like the health educator who has a message to send, even
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though it is not always received, administrators must
always battle the emergency department delay beast.
The Antelope Valley Case study and retrospective
analysis of ambulance delays in the emergency department
due to bed shortages presented a problem of emergency
department delays, their origin, most common reasons for
delays and potential solutions to the problem based upon
what has been done to reduce the delays as well as new
ideas of prevention.
Future Research Needed
While the data extracted offered a considerable amount 
of information, there is^m^e research to be done to 
determine trends in different areas, as well as accurate
tracking of reasons for calling 911, versus the actual
admission reason on the emergency department medical chart.
Proposed Solutions
• Implementation of a computer program would increase
accuracy of extrapolated data
A computer-programmed database in conjunction with the
ambulance provider and emergency department should be 
implemented in order to create a more accurate depiction of
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true emergency department delays. In the Antelope Valley
study, emergency department delays were described as any
time the emergency department staff advises the ambulance
crew there are no beds. The delay clock would begin and
would not end until the crew cleared the hospital. This
method of tracking delay data had the potential to be
extended, especially if the crew failed to clear the
hospital immediately after the patient was unloaded. A
computer database would be able to track the delays more
accurately if the crew could call into dispatch a time of
arrival at the emergency department and a drop time. Even
I
if the crew remained at the hospital after the patient
received a bed, the delay clock would stop at a true drop
I
time. An average drop time would.be established based upon 
an efficacious, reasonable amount of time expected to be
able to secure a bed for their piatient and leave the
emergency department. Delays over the average drop time
only would be tracked. This would render a more accurate
depiction of delay times in the emergency department.
Standardizing the parameters of wait times based upon a 
simple database would reduce the presence of false data.
• The length of the study should have been longer.
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Seven months covers the majority of a year. At the
same time, the period of time this study was conducted was
around the time the weather changes and the likelihood of
illness is higher at the change of seasons. The study
began in September 2000—the beginning of autumn. It
continued through autumn, winter and into spring. At these
times of year, illness is higher, compared to the summer.
The potential for a higher number of emergency department
delays during this time due to an increased number of
illnesses, which taxed emergency resources, had the ability
to negatively affect the results. Though this possibility
existed, three out of the four seasons of the year were
studied. Increasing the period of study would also reduce
the controversy over administrators who use length of study
as a reason to further postpone addressing the emergency
department problem.
• Increased coordination is needed among the ambulance 
provider, emergency department and hospital staff.
Tracking delays in the emergency department from the
ambulance provider's perspective proved to be a challenging
and often times inflammatory process that produced few
positive results with pre-hospital care providers and
hospital line staff. The ambulance providers were placed
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in an uncomfortable position with the county EMS agency,
since the ambulance provider could not always meet the
response time criteria set by the county, due to an
occupied ambulance in the emergency department. The
emergency department staff faced a challenge to reduce wait
time by magically making beds appear for the ambulance
patients, as well as the walk-ins. When the ambulance
provider failed to effectively (and cautiously) communicate
their needs to the hospital staff, the results were less-
than efficacious. The pre-hospital staff is viewed as
unrealistic and unsupportive of the emergency department's
dilemma. The emergency department is presented as
insensitive to the ambulance provider's needs. At times,
the emergency department presented as the origin of the
problem—the reason the ambulance could not unload the
patient and be one their way. Communication between the
two organizations proved to be essential in managing the
problem. In fact, over the period of the study, not only
did emergency department delays not decrease, they
increased in number and length (172-in September 2000 to
347 in April 2001). Communication must be improved to
render a quality service the hospital staff can deliver,
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the ambulance provider can handle and the patient and
county will accept.
Since May 2002, the results of the Antelope Valley
case study have become the leading indicator of emergency
department delay progress in the North Los Angeles County
region. Originally involving American Medical Response
Antelope Valley Division, Los Angeles County Fire
Department and the Antelope Valley hospitals, the monthly
meetings have progressed to a North Los Angeles County task
force now including LA County Department of Health
Services, LA County Public Health Department and LA County
District five (5) Supervisor Mike Antonovich's office. At
the monthly meetings, each agency brings their own data,
issues, experiences over the past month and ideas for
improvement of the system. While the communication has
improved from heated discussions, to controlled
cooperation, the delays remain constant. Antelope Valley 
Hospital has expressed a concern over receiving more than
their fir share of emergency department transports. In
February 2002, they began closing their doors to any
additional patients once they reach saturation. Prior to 
this tactic to "catch up" with the flow of patients through
the emergency department, AVH—like all others—would still
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accept patients; the patients would just have to wait.
Using their current methods, the waits are expected to
increase in number. This action by AVH has also further
complicated the already sensitive relationship between AVH,
pre-hospital care providers and Lancaster Community 
Hospital. Each month, the Antelope Valley population 
increases, the potential for the number and length of
delays also increase.
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